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THE KIRKPATRICK COMMITTEE REPORTSELECTED INSIGHTS
STEPHEN CALKINS

Professor, Wayne State University Law School
My assignment is to supplement what has been said,
plete this reader's guide to the Report. Appendix C,
wealth of information in graphs and tables, deserves
After commenting on each section of the Report, I will
tant tributes.

in order to comwhich contains a
special mention.
pay some impor-

Section 1: Summary. The summary was written carefully by the Committee as a whole. It is unusually comprehensive.
Section 2: Introduction. The introduction describes the Committee's procedures.
Section 3: Leadership. The Report's first substantive section addresses
leadership, because this is critical to the agency's effectiveness. "Above
all, the commissioners should be persons of recognized stature who will
be respected by Congress, the businesses the Commission regulates, and
the consumers it protects."'
Section 4: Antitrust. Graphs three through seven in Appendix C depict
the Commission's changing antitrust priorities. Between 1981 and 1987,
workyears devoted to vertical restraints and market power offenses declined by 92 percent and 88 percent, respectively; workyears devoted to
mergers and joint ventures declined by 24 percent; workyears devoted
to horizontal restraints more than doubled. Workyears devoted to food
industries and natural resources fell by 79 percent and 88 percent, respectively, while workyears devoted to health care increased by 11 percent. In 1988, more than 80 percent of workyears expended on the FTC's
competition mission were devoted to mergers and horizontal restraints.
' REPORT OF THE ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE
ROLE OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION [HEREINAFTER REPORT], 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 43,

60 (1989).
2 The notes are an integral part of the graphs. For instance, note three explains that
prior to 1988 an FTC lawyer challenging horizontal health care restraints probably would
have recorded his or her time under health care, but might have recorded it under
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Section 5: Consumer Protection. Graphs 14 to 19 show that advertising
and rulemaking workyears have fallen substantially, while workyears
devoted to consumer fraud have more than doubled in the past six years.
Section 6: ProvidingGuidance. With the decline in the FTC's adjudicative
role (see Appendix B), it is essential that the FTC affirmatively seek
opportunities to disseminate its views. The best guidance is provided
publicly by the Commission acting as a whole.
Section 7: Competition and Consumer Advocacy. The Committee strongly
endorsed the FTC's advocacy program. The Committee was troubled by
Graph 22, which shows that the number of FTC interventions fell by 68
percent from 1987 to 1988, apparently in response to congressional
criticism of the program.
Section 8: Economics. The Committee also endorsed the role of FTC
economists. It applauded the collegial relationship that exists among
lawyers and economists. Although economists should not have a veto
over prosecutorial decisions, the FTC should hesitate before initiating
action that the economists oppose.
The Committee also emphasized the importance of the FTC's research
role. (It is troubling, in this regard, that Table 2 shows that economics
research workyears fell from 29.6 in 1983 to 7.3 (planned) in 1989.)
However, the FTC should change the focus of some of its research. First,
the FTC should "concentrate on becoming the single most important
repository of knowledge about the actual operation of major U.S. industries. '3 Second, the FTC should develop extensive information about
the U.S.'s antitrust and consumer protection systems. The FTC is wellsituated, for instance, for determining whether competition was harmed
by questionable mergers that were allowed to proceed, or by the preventing of mergers that were arguably procompetitive.
Section 9: Resources.The FTC has 124 lawyers in its Bureau of Competition, 118 in its Bureau of Consumer Protection, and 115 in its regional
offices. This is not enough; the FTC's resources should be increased.
At the same time, the FTC should use its resources more wisely. The
Committee noted that the FTC has become top-heavy, which not only
wastes resources but also harms effectiveness.
Section 10: Congress. The Report reviews the characteristics that make
the FTC unusually vulnerable to congressional pressure. The Report
horizontal restraints instead. As a result, for instance, graph 7 understates workyears
devoted to horizontal restraints. We were told that these graphs accurately show trends,
even though the absolute numbers are unreliable.
3

REPORT,

supra note 1,at 102-03.
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offers a number of suggestions for improving FTC-congressional relations, many of which have been discussed by Cal Collier. One additional
point deserves attention. If an activity should be exempt from the antitrust laws, Congress should proceed, through the responsible committees, to enact an antitrust exemption. There is nojustification for leaving
an activity subject to the antitrust laws but prohibiting the FTC, alone,
from enforcing those laws.
Section 11: Dual Antitrust Enforcement. Three additional points raised in
the discussion of dual antitrust enforcement should be mentioned. First,
there is less dual enforcement than one might think from all the attention
the issue has drawn over the years. The Antitrust Division currently
expends more than seventy-five percent of its resources on mergers and
criminal enforcement. 4 Thus, for the non-merger antitrust enforcement
program outlined in the Report, there may not be an appreciable risk that
dual enforcement will impose significant costs by increasing uncertainty.
Second, dual merger enforcement does not appear to be imposing
significant uncertainty costs. A survey of leading merger lawyers found
that, because of the Hart-Scott-Rodino process, uncertainty about enforcement standards has rarely if ever deterred firms from proposing
mergers. Merger standards are relatively clear and consistent, and the
Hart-Scott-Rodino process provides a relatively inexpensive method of
testing government reaction. Antitrust lawyers usually recommend reporting a questionable merger and hoping for the best.
Third, although the Committee described the benefits of dual enforcement, it expressed concern about the length of time it takes the Commission to write opinions. "Only partly in jest do we suggest that the commissioners announce an official summer recess, and then, as does the
Supreme Court, discipline themselves by delaying its commencement
until they have decided that term's cases. '
Section 12: Unity of Functions. A majority of the Committee believe that
the FTC should retain its roles as prosecutor and adjudicator. The Report
discusses but makes no recommendations concerning suggestions to reduce the number of commissioners and the length of commissioner
terms.
Appendix B: Changes in Authority Since 1969. We once thought of the
FTC as an agency that issues administrative complaints, assigns them to
lawjudges, and then hears appeals from initial decisions. That conception
is no longer correct. In 1988, the FTC filed more than half its complaints
REPORT, supra note
5 REPORT, supra note

1, at 62 n.9.
1, at 116 n.168.
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in federal district court. In 1980, there were thirteen administrative law
judges; today there are three.
Graphs 21, 24, and 25 tell the story. The number of cases pending
before ALJs fell by seventy-six percent from 1979 to 1988. During 1985
through 1987, FTC professionals spent comparable workyears on court
and administrative litigation. In 1988, they devoted more than twice as
much time to court litigation. These figures are the more remarkable
because they exclude workyears spent by the general counsel's office.
The change has been most dramatic for the Bureau of Consumer Protection and the regional offices; for each, court workyears have exceeded
administrative litigation workyears in each of the past five years. Even
for the Bureau of Competition, administrative litigation's lead has been
steadily shrinking. In short, a sea change has occurred in the FTC's
role. This change reemphasizes the significance of the agency's role as a
prosecutor and makes it especially important that the agency regularly
offer guidance.
TRIBUTES AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
That completes the reader's guide to the Report. With your indulgence, let me close by offering four quick but important tributes.' First,
the Report could not have been prepared without the assistance of the
Committee's deputy counsel and assistant counsel, Kathy Wallman and
Sandra Spear. Kathy, an Arnold & Porter lawyer who served pro bono,
researched, drafted, and edited, and recruited and then supervised support staff. Sandra, a Covington & Burling lawyer who served pro bono,
also drafted and edited, and was largely responsible for preparing the
data that is presented in Appendix C.
Second, Irv Scher deserves credit. It is all too easy for an ABA Antitrust
Section chair to encourage only activities that he initiated. Although our
Committee was appointed by Jim Rill, we conducted our study during
Irv Scher's term as Section Chair-and he worked with us every step of
the way. He offered suggestions, he provided support, and he preserved
the project as a Section priority. His unselfish and valuable assistance
deserves praise.
Third, Jim Rill deserves a special tribute. This Report is the result of
his vision. He persuaded the Section to endorse the idea, he announced
the decision, and then he made it happen. When we needed ABA approval, he flew to the ABA meeting in Denver and obtained it. When we
realized how much the study would cost, he told me,"Look, Steve, I have
6Appendix A lists biographies of Committee members.
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sent my fleet halfway around the world, and we'll figure out a way to
bring it back. So press on." And press on we did. Jim appointed an
extraordinary committee and then, as a member of that committee, he
was an active participant in the deliberations. Jim's fleet is finally back in
port. He deserves great credit for launching it and playing a key role in
bringing, it back.
Finally, all of us owe a special debt to Miles Kirkpatrick. When Jim Rill
learned that Miles would serve as chair, he knew that the Report would
become a reality. Miles shaped the entire process. He was on the telephone with me regularly, prodding, making changes, and keeping things
on track. Equally important, Miles established the tone of the Report.
From the beginning, he said that this would not be the same kind of
detailed critique as the 1969 Report. Miles set the agenda for our meetings and presided over them with a light, graceful, yet firm hand, keeping
the discussion on point and moving forward, closing off unproductive
debates, and searching for the consensus that he found. The absence of
dissent is really a personal tribute to his leadership. It was an honor to
work with one of the legends of antitrust on the second Kirkpatrick
Report.

